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A Deflationary Account of Mental Representation 
 
Frances Egan 
 
Among the cognitive capacities of evolved creatures is the capacity to represent. Theories 
in cognitive neuroscience typically explain our manifest representational capacities by 
positing internal representations, but there is little agreement about how these 
representations function, especially with the relatively recent proliferation of 
connectionist, dynamical, embodied, enactive, and Bayesian approaches to cognition. In 
this paper I sketch an account of the nature and function of representation in cognitive 
neuroscience that couples a realist construal of representational vehicles with a pragmatic 
account of representational content. I call the resulting package a deflationary account of 
mental representation and I argue that it avoids the problems that afflict competing 
accounts. 
 
1. Preliminaries 
 A commitment to representation presupposes a distinction between 
representational vehicle and representational content. The vehicle is a physically realized 
state or structure that carries or bears content. Insofar as a representation is causally 
involved in a cognitive process, it is in virtue of the representational vehicle. A state or 
structure has content just in case it represents things to be a certain way; it has a 
‘satisfaction condition’ – the condition under which it represents accurately. 
 We can sharpen the distinction by reference to a simple example. See figure [1]. 
Most generally, a physical system computes the addition function just in case there exists 
a mapping from physical state types to numbers, such that physical state types related by 
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a causal state transition relation are mapped to numbers n, m, and n+m related as addends 
and sums. But a perspicuous rendering of a computational model of an adder depicts two  
 
Figure 1 
mappings: at the bottom, a realization function (fR) that specifies the physically realized 
vehicles of representation – here, numerals, but more generally structures or states of 
some sort – and, at the top, an interpretation function (fI) that specifies their content. The 
bottom two horizontal arrows depict causal relations (the middle at a higher level of 
abstraction); the top arrow depicts the arguments and values of the computed function. 
When the system is in the physical states that under the mapping represent the numbers n, 
m (for example, 2 and 3) it is caused to go into the physical state that under the mapping 
represents their sum (i.e. 5). 
 For any representational construal of a cognitive system we can ask two 
EXAMPLE – ADDITION 
n,   m                                                  n + m 
              
                                                                   fI    
s1, s2                                                     s3 
     
                                                                   fR 
  p1, p2                                                                               p3                                       
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questions: (1) How do the posited internal representations get their meanings? This, in 
effect, is the problem of intentionality; and (2) What is it for an internal state or structure 
to function as a representation, in particular, to serve as a representational vehicle? The 
appeal to representations should not be idle – positing representations should do some 
genuine explanatory work. In our terms, what is at stake with (1) and (2) is justifying the 
interpretation and the realization functions respectively. I shall discuss each in turn 
below.   
 First, however, it is useful to set out Ramsey’s (2007) adequacy conditions on a 
theory of mental representation. This will provide a framework for evaluating the account 
to be defended here. Ramsey identifies at least five general constraints: 
1. Mental representations should serve a function sufficiently like paradigm cases of 
representation. Public language is probably the clearest case; maps are another 
exemplar. 
2. The content of mental representations should be causally relevant to their role in 
cognitive processes.  
3. The account should not imply pan-representationalism: lots of clearly non-
representational things should not count as representations. 
4. The account should not under-explain representational capacities; it should not, 
for example, presuppose such intentional capacities as understanding.  
5. Neither should it over-explain representational capacities, such that representation 
is explained away. For example, according to Ramsey, if representations function 
as ‘mere causal relays’ then, in effect, the phenomenon of interest has 
disappeared. 
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 With Ramsey’s adequacy conditions for a theory of mental representation on the 
table, let’s turn to our first problem: the problem of mental content. 
 
2. Representational content: the naturalistic proposals 
We can identify several widely accepted constraints on an account of content for 
cognitive neuroscience:  
(1) The account should provide the basis for the attribution of determinate contents to the 
posited states or structures.  
(2) The account should allow for the possibility that the posited states can misrepresent. 
The motivating idea is that genuinely representational states represent robustly, in the 
way that paradigmatic mental states such as beliefs represent; they allow for the 
possibility of getting it wrong. 
 There is a constitutive connection between constraints (1) and (2). If the theory 
cannot underwrite the attribution of determinate satisfaction conditions to a mental state 
(type), then it cannot support the claim that some possible tokenings of the state occur 
when the conditions are not satisfied, and hence would misrepresent. 
(3) The account should be naturalistic. Typically, this constraint is construed as requiring 
a specification, in non-semantic and non-intentional terms, of (at least) a sufficient 
condition for a state or structure to have a particular content. Such a specification would 
guarantee that the theory makes no illicit appeal to the very phenomenon – meaning – 
that it is supposed to explain. This idea motivates so-called tracking theories, discussed 
below. More generally, the constraint is motivated by the conviction that intentionality is 
not fundamental:  
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It’s hard to see… how one can be a realist about intentionality without also being, to 
some extent or other, a reductionist. If the semantic and the intentional are real 
properties of things, it must be in virtue of their identity with (or maybe 
supervenience on) properties that are themselves neither intentional nor semantic. If 
aboutness is real, it must be something else. (Fodor 1987, 97) 
 
There are no “ultimately semantic” facts or properties, i.e. no semantic facts or 
properties over and above the facts and properties of physics, chemistry, biology, 
neurophysiology, and those parts of psychology, sociology, and anthropology that can 
be expressed independently of semantic concepts. (Field 1975, 386) 
Finally, (4) the account should conform to the actual practice of content attribution in 
cognitive neuroscience. It should be empirically accurate.  
 Explicitly naturalistic theories explicate content in terms of a privileged  
relation between the tokening of an internal state and the object or property the state 
represents. Thus the state is said to ‘track’ (in some specified sense) the external 
condition that serves as its satisfaction condition. To satisfy the naturalistic constraint 
both the relation and the relata must be specified in non-intentional and non-semantic 
terms. Various theories offer different accounts of the content-determining relation. I will 
discuss very briefly the most popular proposals, focusing on their failure, so far, to 
underwrite the attribution of determinate contents to internal states. I will then illustrate 
how a pragmatic account of content of the sort I defend handles this thorny issue.  
 Information-theoretic accounts hold, very roughly, that an internal state S means 
cat if and only if S is caused by the presence of a cat, and certain further conditions 
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obtain.1 Further conditions are required to allow for the possibility of misrepresentation, 
that is, for the possibility that some S-tokenings are not caused by cats but, say, by large 
rats on a dark night, and hence misrepresent a large rat as a cat. A notable problem for 
information-theoretic theories is the consequence that everything in the causal chain from 
the presence of a cat in the distal environment to the internal tokening of S, including cat-
like patterns in the retinal image, appears to satisfy the condition, and so would fall into 
S’s extension. Thus, information-theoretic theories typically founder on constraint (1), 
failing to underwrite determinate contents for mental states, and hence have trouble 
specifying conditions under which tokenings of the state would misrepresent (condition 
(2)). The outstanding problem for such theories is to provide for determinacy without 
illicit appeal to intentional or semantic notions.  
 Teleological theories hold that internal state S means cat if and only if S has the 
natural function of indicating cats. The view was first developed and defended by 
Millikan (1984), and there are now many interesting variations on the central idea.2 
Teleosemanticists have notoriously been unable to agree on the natural function of states 
of even the simplest organisms.3 Let’s focus on a widely-discussed case. Does the inner 
state responsible for engaging a frog’s tongue-lashing behavior have the function of 
indicating (and hence representing) fly, frog food, or small dark moving thing? 
Teleosemanticists, at various times, have proposed all three. We might settle on fly, but 
 
1 See Dretske 1981 and Fodor 1990 for the most developed information-theoretic 
accounts. Further conditions include the requirement that during a privileged learning 
period only cats cause S-tokenings (Dretske 1981) or that non-cat caused S-tokenings 
depend asymmetrically on cat-caused S-tokenings (Fodor 1990).  
2 See Matthen 1988, Papineau 1993, Dretske 1995, Ryder 2004, Neander 2006, 2017, and 
Shea 2007, 2018 for other versions of teleosemantics. 
3 See the discussion of the magnetosome in Dretske 1986 and Millikan 1989. 
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then Quinean indeterminacy4 rears its head: a fly stage detector or an undetached fly part 
detector would serve the purpose of getting nutrients into the frog’s stomach equally well. 
The problem is that indeterminate functions cannot ground determinate contents. Each of 
various function-candidates specifies a different satisfaction condition; unless a 
compelling case can be made for one function-candidate over the others, teleosemantics 
runs afoul of constraint (1). Moreover, the argument must not appeal to intentional or 
normative considerations (such as what makes for a good explanation), on pain of 
violating the naturalistic constraint.   
 A third type of tracking theory appeals to the type of relation that holds between a 
map and the domain it represents, that is, structural similarity or isomorphism.5 Cummins 
1989, Ramsey 2007, and Shagrir 2012 have proposed variations on this idea. Of course, 
since similarity is a symmetric relation but the representation relation is not, any account 
that attempts to ground representational content in similarity will need supplementation 
by appeal to something like use. Of more concern in the present context, a given set of 
internal states or structures is likely to be structurally similar to any number of external 
conditions. The question is whether structural similarity can be sufficiently constrained to 
underwrite determinate contents while still respecting the naturalistic constraint.    
 The upshot of this short discussion is that tracking theories of mental content face 
formidable problems in underwriting content determinacy, and hence the possibility of 
misrepresentation, in a way that satisfies the naturalistic constraint. One might simply 
conclude that more work needs to be done, that naturalistic semantic theorists should 
 
4 See Quine 1960. 
5 Better, homomorphism, or what O’Brien & Opie 2004 call a ‘second-order 
resemblance’ (p.11). 
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continue to look for naturalistic conditions that would further constrain content. 
However, if the proposed meaning-determining relation becomes too baroque it will fail 
to be explanatory, leaving us wondering why that particular relation determines content.  
 Despite the fact that there is no widely accepted naturalistic foundation for 
representational content, computational theorists persist in employing representational 
language in articulating their models. It is unlikely that they have discovered a 
naturalistic meaning-determining relation that has so far eluded philosophers. Shea (2013, 
499) claims that cognitive science takes semantic properties for granted, “offer[ing] no 
settled view about what makes it the case that the representations relied on have the 
contents they do. The content question has been largely left to philosophy…” There is 
something right about this idea, which I will say more about in the next section, but on its 
face it would be a bitter pill for the majority of philosophers of mind who look to the 
cognitive sciences, and in particular, to computational neuroscience, to provide a 
naturalistic explanation of our representational capacities. Their hopes would be dashed if 
cognitive science just kicks the project of naturalizing the mind back to philosophy. 
 The apparent mismatch between the theories of content developed by 
philosophers pursuing the naturalistic semantics project and the actual practice of 
computational theorists in attributing content in their models cries out for explanation; it 
motivates a different sort of account.  
  
3. Representational content: a pragmatic alternative6 
 
6 See Egan (2014) for elaboration and defense of the view sketched here. See also Coelho 
Mollo (2017). 
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The view that I favor builds on the central insight of tracking theories – states of mind 
represent aspects of the world by tracking, in some sense, the distal objects and properties 
that they are about – but it doesn’t suppose that a naturalistically specifiable relation is 
sufficient to determine a mental state’s satisfaction condition. Additional, pragmatic, 
considerations play an essential role.   
 A content assignment requires empirical justification, and this requires a certain 
fit between the mechanism and the world. A content assignment that interprets states of a 
system as representing Dow-Jones stock index prices would be justified only if the states 
track the vagaries of the market, and to do that (barring a miracle) there must be a causal 
connection between the states of the system and market prices. The fit between biological 
systems and distal objects and properties is, of course, is a product of natural selection, 
but it doesn’t follow, as teleosemanticists seem to assume, that evolutionary function – 
the historical relation that holds between a structure’s tokening and its normal cause in 
the EEA – best serves the cognitive (scientific) theorist’s explanatory goals. It may not, 
for example, if the goal is to explain how a cognitive mechanism works in the here and 
now. The various tracking relations privileged by naturalistic semantic theories 
characterize different ways that states of mind can fit the world, with the choice among 
tracking relations determined by explanatory, or broadly pragmatic, considerations. 
 Let me elaborate. In ascribing representational contents the cognitive theorist may 
look for a distal causal antecedent of an internal structure’s tokening, or a homomorphism 
between distal and internal elements, but the search is constrained primarily by the 
cognitive capacity that the theory is developed to explain. For example, vision theorists 
will look to properties that can structure the light in appropriate ways; thus they construe 
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the states and structures they posit as representing light intensity values, changes in light 
intensity, and further downstream, changes in depth and surface orientation. Theorists of 
motor control construe the structures they posit as representing positions of objects in 
nearby space and changes in body joint angles. And the assignment of task-specific 
content – what I call cognitive content – is justified only if the theorist can explain how 
the posited structures are used by the system in ways that subserve the cognitive capacity 
in question.  
 We can see the extent to which pragmatic considerations figure in the ascription 
of content by revisiting some of the problems encountered by tracking theories in their 
attempt to specify a naturalistic content-determining relation. Far from adhering to the 
strict program imposed by the naturalistic constraint, as understood by tracking theorists, 
the computational theorist, in assigning content to posited internal structures, selects from 
all the information in the signal just what is relevant for the cognitive capacity to be 
explained and specifies it in a way that is salient for explanatory purposes. Typically, 
pragmatic considerations will privilege a distal cause (the cat) over a proximal cause (cat-
like patterns in the retinal image), because a distal content ascription will facilitate an 
explanation of the interaction between the organism and its environment necessary for the 
organism’s success. Recall the dispute among teleo-semanticists about whether the frog’s 
internal state represents fly or frog food or small dark moving thing. The dispute is 
unlikely to be settled without reference to specific explanatory concerns. If the goal of the 
theoretical project is to explain the frog’s role in its environmental niche, then the theorist 
is likely to assign the content fly. Alternatively, if the goal is to explain how the frog’s 
visual mechanisms work, then small dark moving thing might be preferred. In other 
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words, explanatory focus resolves indeterminacy. Turning to Quinean indeterminacy, 
theories are articulated in public language and the ontology implicit in public language 
privileges fly over fly stage. These content choices are not motivated by naturalistic 
considerations – the naturalistic constraint prohibits appeal to specific explanatory 
interests or to public meaning. Attention to actual practice reveals that pragmatic 
considerations motivate the choice among naturalistic alternatives and secure content 
determinacy. 
 Cognitive content is not part of the essential characterization of a computational 
mechanism and is not fruitfully regarded as part of what I call the computational theory 
proper. The theory proper comprises a specification of the function (in the mathematical 
sense) computed by the mechanism,7 specification of the algorithms, structures, and 
processes involved in the computation, as well as what I call the ecological component of 
the theory – typically facts about robust co-variations between tokenings of internal states 
and distal property instantiations under normal environmental conditions, which 
constrain, but do not fully determine, the attribution of cognitive content, as explained 
above. The computational theory proper is, strictly speaking, sufficient to explain the 
system’s success (and occasional failure) at the cognitive task (seeing what is where in 
 
7 See Egan (2017) for elaboration and defense of what I call function-theoretic (FT) 
characterization, which is an environment-neutral, cognitive domain-general 
characterization of a mechanism. The inputs of a computationally characterized 
mechanism represent the arguments and the outputs the values of the mathematical 
function that canonically specifies the task executed by the mechanism: for example, 
smoothing functions for perceptual mechanisms (see Marr 1982, among many others), 
path integration for navigation mechanisms (see Gallistel 1990), vector subtraction for 
reaching and pointing (Shadmehr and Wise 2005). Hence, the FT characterization 
specifies a kind of content – mathematical content – that is distinct from the (cognitive) 
domain-specific content that philosophers typically have in mind when they talk about 
‘representational content’ and which I call ‘cognitive content’. 
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the scene, object manipulation, and so on) that is the explanatory target of the theory. 
 Cognitive content is not in the theory proper; rather it is best construed as a kind 
of gloss – an intentional gloss – on the computational theory. It is ascribed to facilitate 
the explanation of the relevant cognitive capacity. The primary function of an intentional 
gloss is to illustrate, in a perspicuous and concise way, how the computational theory 
addresses the intentionally-characterized phenomena with which the theorist began and 
which it is the job of the theory to explain. Cognitive content is ‘connective tissue’ 
linking the sub-personal (primarily mathematical8) capacities posited in the theory and 
the manifest personal-level capacity that is the theory’s explanatory target (vision, 
grasping an object in view, and so on). But, as I noted above, the computational theory 
proper can fully explain the interaction between organism and environment, and hence 
the organism’s success, without adverting to cognitive content. The intentional gloss 
characterizes the interaction between the organism and its environment that enables the 
cognitive capacity in terms of the former representing elements of the latter; the theory 
does not. 
 A second important heuristic function served by the assignment of 
representational content is to help us keep track of the flow of information in the system, 
or, to be more explicit, help us – theorists and students of cognitive neuroscience – keep 
track of changes in the system caused by both environmental events and internal 
processes, with an eye on the cognitive capacity (e.g. seeing what is where) that is the 
explanatory target of the theory. The choice of content will be responsive to such 
considerations as ease of explanation, and so may involve considerable idealization.  
 
8 See footnote 7. 
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 A third function of content ascription is worth noting here; it will play a role in 
my argument later. A content ascription can serve as a temporary placeholder for an 
incompletely developed computational theory of a cognitive capacity and so guide the 
discovery of mechanisms underlying the capacity. For example, at the early stages of 
theory development, prior to the specification of the mathematical function computed and 
the structures and processes that enable the computation, a visual theorist may 
characterize a to-be-specified structure as representing edges or some other visible 
property of the distal scene. She may even call the structure an EDGE (as Marr does), 
foreshadowing the functional role that the structure will play in the processes to be 
described by the theory. Or a capacity may be characterized initially in intentional terms, 
as, say, shape from shading, prior to the development of the computational theory that 
explains the capacity. At this stage there may be little or no theory to gloss; nonetheless 
the intentional characterization plays an important role in the search for the mechanisms 
and processes underlying the intentionally described capacity. 
 Let me return to Shea’s (2013) claim that cognitive science takes semantic 
properties for granted, leaving the project of specifying the conditions for content 
attribution to philosophy. On the account I have sketched, there is a clear sense in which 
computational theorists do take meanings for granted: they don’t attempt to reduce 
mental content, nor do they assume that some naturalistically kosher relation grounds 
content attribution. Rather, they use unreduced, pragmatically motivated, content to 
explicate (gloss) their theories, and to serve the various explanatory functions described 
above. In doing so they help themselves to the ontology implicit in public language. But, 
pace Shea, I am sure they would be surprised to hear that the naturalistic bona fides of 
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their theories depend upon philosophers finding the holy grail of a naturalistic content-
determining relation.  
 I shall conclude the discussion of representational content by returning to the 
constraints on an adequate account of content for cognitive neuroscience discussed 
above. In the first place, the account should provide the basis for determinate contents. 
The pragmatic account does this by explicitly recognizing the role of explanatory 
interests and other pragmatic considerations in determining content ascription. Secondly, 
the account should allow for the possibility of misrepresentation. Once determinacy is 
secured, we can see how misrepresentation can arise on the pragmatic account. Assume 
that the interpretation function (fI), justified in part by reference to pragmatic 
considerations, assigns the determinate content fly to a posited internal state. If the system 
goes into that state in the absence of a fly, then it misrepresents some other condition as a 
fly.  
 The third constraint requires that the account be naturalistic. At first blush, it may 
seem that the appeal to explanatory and other pragmatic considerations in the 
determination of representational content would compromise the naturalistic credentials 
of cognitive neuroscience. That isn’t so, because the pragmatic elements and the contents 
they determine are ‘quarantined’ in the intentional gloss, to use Mark Sprevak’s (2013) 
apt description of my view. The theory proper does not traffic in ordinary (i.e. cognitive 
task-specific) representational contents, so its naturalistic credentials are not threatened. 
 I want to consider the empirical adequacy of the deflationary account of 
representation as a whole, so I shall postpone discussion of the final constraint until later. 
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4. Representational vehicles 
 
Turning now to our second question: what is it for an internal state or structure to 
function as a representation, that is, to serve as a representational vehicle?  
 Many of our intuitions about representation are shaped by thinking about public 
language, which is the model for the most popular account of mental representation. 
According to the language of thought hypothesis (LOT) mental representations are 
literally symbols in an internal language (aka mentalese), and mental processes are to be 
understood as operations on internal sentences.9 Like more familiar linguistic systems, 
LOT has a compositional syntax (specified by a realization function fR) and semantics 
(specified by an interpretation function fI ). The content of LOT representations is said to 
be explicitly represented, as opposed to represented implicitly in the architecture of the 
system.10 But the analogy with public language can be misleading. While the information 
encoded in printed text is (in some sense) explicit, it must be usable. Think, for example, 
of an encyclopedia without an index or a library without a catalogue. In addition to inert 
data structures there must be processes that read them. And the process that “reads” 
mental representations can’t involve understanding, on pain of under-explaining our 
representational capacities, as Ramsey might put it. As Fodor (1980) noted with his 
formality condition, computational processes are sensitive only to formal (that is, non-
semantic) properties of representations. The relevant properties of the symbols to which 
computational processes are sensitive will be specified by the realization function fR. 
 A wide variety of cognitive models do not posit explicit representations, in the 
above sense. To mention just a few: (i) connectionist models typically explain cognitive 
 
9 Jerry Fodor is LOT’s most ardent champion. See, especially, Fodor 1975 and 2008. 
10 See Kirsh 1990 for a useful discussion of the notion of explicit representation. 
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phenomena as the propagation of activation among units in highly connected networks; 
(ii) dynamical models characterize cognitive processes by a set of differential equations 
describing the behavior of the system over time; (iii) enactive models treat cognition as 
consisting, fundamentally, of a dynamic interaction between the subject and the 
environment, rather than a static representation of that environment. None of these 
models characterize cognitive processes as involving computational operations defined 
on symbol structures. A relatively recent development in Bayesian modeling, predictive 
processing models, treat the brain as a predictive machine that uses perception and action 
to minimize prediction error; it is not obvious that predictive processing models lend 
themselves naturally to a representational construal in the sense presumed by LOT. The 
proliferation of various types of cognitive modeling compels us to re-examine our 
intuitions about when and how information is encoded in a system. At very least, the 
linguistic model underlying LOT seems overly restrictive.  
 In general, intuitions differ on the representational status of the various types of 
models. Clark (1997), Bechtel (1998, 2001), and others argue for a representational 
construal of connectionist and dynamical models. Chemero (2009), Gallagher (2008), and 
Ramsey (2007) argue that they do not posit representations. According to Ramsey the 
structures posited in connectionist models are “mere causal relays.” If they count as 
representations, he cautions, then pan representationalism threatens.   
 A locus of dispute has been the Watt governor [Figure 2], first introduced into the 
discussion by Van Gelder (1995).  
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Figure 2 
As the speed of the engine increases, centrifugal force elevates the arms of the flywheel, 
closing off a valve and restricting the flow of steam, thereby decreasing the engine speed.  
The issue is whether the angle of the arms represents the speed of the flywheel. Bechtel 
(1998, 2001) and Chemero (2000) think that a representational construal is appropriate; 
Ramsey (2007) and Shapiro (2010) think it is not. Another hotly disputed case is the toy 
car [Figure 2] described by Ramsey (2007, p.199).  
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Figure 3 
The car negotiates a tricky S-curve tunnel by making use of a groove-and-rudder system 
that guides the wheels of the car smoothly through the curve. According to Ramsey the 
system is representational because it uses a structure that is isomorphic to the curved 
tunnel. But the representational construal of the system is open to dispute. Whatever 
representational capacity the car has doesn’t generalize – it can’t negotiate other tracks. 
And Tonneau (2011) argues that, by Ramsey’s measure, a key represents a lock. 
 We can identify at least three general motivations for resisting a representational 
construal of a cognitive model: (1) a too narrow, language-based construal of 
representation, in other words, the intuition that only models that posit interpreted symbol 
structures with a compositional syntax count as representational. It should be noted, 
however, that not all public representation involves such symbol structures – maps, for 
example, do not – so the intuition that internal representations must be quasi-linguistic is 
dubious; (2) the idea, popular among proponents of embodied and enactive approaches, 
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that representation is not necessary for cognition;11 and (3) the worry, often expressed by 
proponents of enactivism, that a naturalistic account of representational content is simply 
not in the cards, and so invoking representations in a scientific account of cognition is 
indefensible. Hutto and Myin (2013) claim that representation-based theories “… are 
unable to account for the origins of content in the world if they are forced to use nothing 
but the standard naturalist resources of informational covariance, even if these are 
augmented by devices that have the biological function of responding to such 
information.” (2013, xv), dubbing this the hard problem of content. They identify three 
options for the theorist of cognition: (i) give up content, and hence mental representation; 
(ii) hope that content can be naturalized in some other way; or (iii) posit content as an 
irreducible, explanatory primitive, in other words, embrace a kind of dualism. Enactivists 
propose (i), eschewing content and hence mental representation. But, as I have argued 
above, there is a fourth option for dealing with the ‘hard problem’: don’t give up on 
content, but recognize that it is in part pragmatically determined, and confine it to an 
explanatory gloss.  
 Let’s return to the central issue of this section: what is it for an internal state to 
function as a representation? I suggest that focusing on non-cognitive cases – the Watt 
governor, Ramsey’s car – tells us very little about how representations function in 
accounts of cognition. Intuitions about these cases are not dispositive. It is more fruitful 
to focus on the typical explanatory context in which a theory in cognitive science is 
 
11 Rodney Brooks (1991, 81) famously claimed: “…explicit representations and models 
of the world simply get in the way. It is better to use the world as its own model.” Despite 
the rhetoric, Brooks doesn’t argue against representations per se, but rather against 
positing general context-free representation of the environment, and separate, explicit 
representation of goals. He is the father of ‘action-oriented representations’.   
 20 
developed – a manifest cognitive capacity such as seeing what is where in the scene, 
locomotion, manipulating objects in view, and so on – and ask under what conditions 
such a theory is committed to representations. This project is more modest – it won’t tell 
us what it is to function as a representation in general. There may not be an interesting 
non-disjunctive answer to that question.12 Rather, what we seek is an account of what it is 
to function as a representation in an explanatory account of a cognitive capacity. This 
would fall short of a general metaphysical account of representation, but it would be 
interesting nonetheless. 
 As it happens, our characterization of the adder [figure 1] provides the basis for 
answering the question. The mapping fR isolates the causal structure relevant for the 
exercise of a given cognitive capacity. This will typically involve characterizing a set of 
states or structures, and the properties of these states or structures in virtue of which they 
play the distinctive roles they do in the exercise of the capacity. These states/structures 
will function as representations – in particular, as representational vehicles – just in case 
they are interpreted by a mapping fI that assigns them contents. Given the content 
assignment specified by fI the states or structures specified by fR are not ‘mere causal 
relays’, as they would be without the semantic interpretation.  
 The representational vehicles specified by fR are as real as states or structures 
posited in any well-confirmed scientific explanation of observable phenomena. An 
analogy may be helpful: genes are realized by physical/chemical structures; molecular 
biology groups these structures together by their causal powers to produce proteins 
ultimately responsible for particular phenotypical effects, abstracting away from some of 
 
12 The concept representation may not pick out a natural kind but rather be a motley, 
functioning differently in different contexts. This possibility can’t be ruled out a priori.  
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their more basic physical/chemical properties. Similarly, the realization function (fR) 
abstracts away from some of the properties of the realizing neural states and groups them 
together by their role in cognitive processing. In both cases, the states/structures may be 
multiply realized by states/structures characterized at the more basic level. In both cases, 
assuming that the theory is empirically well-confirmed, a realist attitude toward the 
posited structures is appropriate.  
 The upshot is that a cognitive model – whether so-called ‘classical’, 
connectionist, dynamical, embodied, or enactive – posits representations just in case it 
identifies representational vehicles, via fR, and assign them contents in fI. The kinds of 
states or structures that can count as representational vehicles – the kinds of objects and 
properties specified by fR – is left open.13 Intuitions grounded in our familiarity with 
public representational systems carry little weight here. A connectionist model that 
construes characteristic patterns of activation of hidden units to be causally efficacious in 
the exercise of a given cognitive capacity and assigns these patterns of activation 
contents in an appropriate gloss would thereby posit representations. 
 An implication of the view is that to determine whether an explanatory theory of a 
cognitive capacity posits representations it must be articulated at the level of structures 
and processes. Absent an account of the causal organization of the system given by fR, we 
cannot determine the representational commitments of the theory. That said, my account 
of computational characterization is something of an idealization. A complete fR mapping 
specifies precisely how the mechanism is realized in neural hardware. Many 
 
13 Since fR specifies the causal organization of the system, the relevant objects and 
properties must be capable of having causal powers. Abstracta, therefore, cannot function 
as representational vehicles. 
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computational models are not fully articulated at the level of neural structure. The 
important point here is that a theory is committed to representations only if it posits 
structures/states to serve as representational vehicles, and causal processes in which these 
vehicles are involved, even if the realizing neural details are yet to be supplied. 
 The proposed account of mental representation couples a realist account of 
representational vehicles and a pragmatic account of representational content. The 
resulting package is deflationary about mental representation. Contents serve a variety of 
heuristic purposes but are not part of what I have called the ‘theory proper.’ They are, 
strictly speaking, not necessary to explain the target phenomena and are best construed as 
part of an explanatory gloss. They are not determined by a privileged representation 
relation but are rather motivated by a variety of pragmatic considerations. A deflationary 
view of mental representation is not a species of fictionalism.14 Fictional objects cannot 
play causal roles in cognitive processes, as representations are presumed to do. Neither is 
it a version of interpretivism, as that view is normally understood.15 The states/structures 
that are interpreted in the gloss have their causal roles – though, of course, not their 
representational contents – independently of the interpretative practices of theorists. 
 
 
5. Satisfying the Adequacy Conditions 
 
Let us see how the deflationary account fares with respect to Ramsey’s (2007) adequacy 
conditions. 
(1) Mental representations must serve a function sufficiently like paradigm cases of 
 
14 A fictionalist construal of neural representation has been discussed (though not 
endorsed) by Sprevak (2013). 
15 See, for example, Dennett (1987). 
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representation.   
 Considering the variety of functions served by public representations with which 
we are familiar – utterances, inscriptions, maps, photographs, graphs, and so on – it isn’t 
clear that there is a single function shared by paradigm cases. However, representations 
are often said to stand in for the object or property specified by their content, where the 
relation of ‘standing in’ is left sufficiently vague to cover the central cases. But this is no 
less true for mental representations, as characterized by the deflationary account. Once a 
representational vehicle is assigned a content in an appropriate gloss, then it can be 
regarded, for all intents and purposes, as standing in (in the same vague sense) for the 
object or property specified by that content. The stand-in plays a characteristic causal role 
in the exercise of the target cognitive capacity. 
(2) The content of mental representations should be causally relevant to their role in 
cognitive processes.  
 Many philosophers have made this point.16 Dretske (1988) talks about “… content 
getting its hands on the wheel.” Of course, since content is abstract, it cannot literally be 
a cause of anything. Rather, the requirement seems to be something like this: the content 
that a state has causally explains the role that the state plays in cognitive processing. So 
understood, the requirement puts the cart before the horse, and so should be rejected. 
Content captures a salient part of the causal nexus in which the state is embedded. For 
example, construing the frog’s internal structure as representing fly emphasizes the causes 
of its tokening in the frog’s normal ecological niche (its production); construing it as 
representing frog food emphasizes downstream nutritional effects of its tokening (its 
 
16 For a sample of the literature promoting this idea see Dretske (1988), Segal and Sober 
(1991), and Rescorla (2014). 
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consumption).) Thus it is no surprise that content looks to be causally relevant – one of its 
jobs, as noted above, is to characterize internal structures/states in a way that makes 
perspicuous their causal role in a cognitive process, again, given specific explanatory 
concerns. But content doesn’t causally explain anything. 
(3) The account should not imply pan-representationalism: lots of clearly non-
representational things shouldn’t count as representations. 
 Pan-representationalism is not a worry for the deflationary account, because it 
does not purport to offer a metaphysical theory of representation. It does not specify a 
general representation relation that holds independently of explanatory practice in 
cognitive neuroscience. This is one sense in which the account is deflationary. The view 
has no implications for Venus-fly traps, Watt governors, and some of the other things 
Ramsey cautions may turn out to be representations if the account is not sufficiently 
constrained.    
(4) The account should not under-explain representational capacities; it should not, for 
example, presuppose such mental capacities as understanding. 
 The realization function fR isolates the causal structure relevant for the exercise of 
the target cognitive capacity. It characterizes the states or structures that serve as 
representational vehicles and the properties of these states/structures in virtue of which 
they play the distinctive causal roles they do in the exercise of the capacity. Cognitive 
processes are not sensitive to any semantic or intentional properties that the vehicles may 
be assigned in the interpretation function fI, so the theory does not posit or presuppose 
any intentional processes such as understanding. Moreover, as explained above, there is 
no appeal to a representational relation in what I call the ‘theory proper’. So the 
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deflationary account does not under-explain our representational capacities, in Ramsey’s 
sense. If anything, it may seem at risk of violating his final condition: 
(5) It should not over-explain representational capacities, such that representation is 
explained away.  
 According to Ramsey, if representations function as ‘mere causal relays’ then, in 
effect, the phenomenon of interest has disappeared. Causal relays are ubiquitous; surely 
not all of them are representations. I claim that representations are distinguished from 
mere causal relays by the fact that they are assigned contents by the interpretation 
function fI, but since the content assignment is confined to the heuristic gloss, it might be 
argued that the phenomenon of interest – representation – has indeed disappeared. My 
response to this charge is to challenge the adequacy condition.  
 Cognitive neuroscience purports to give reductive accounts of cognitive 
capacities. This is what Fodor and Field, motivated by the conviction that intentionality is 
not fundamental, were asking for in the passages quoted above. The same conviction 
motivates the naturalistic semantics project. But a reductive account of a phenomenon – 
especially a mental phenomenon, with which we have an intimate, first-person 
acquaintance – will often tend to look like over-explaining. The phenomenon of interest 
may seem to have ‘disappeared.’ By the same token, biochemistry, in explaining the 
essence of life in terms of carbon-based molecular processes, may appear to have over-
explained its target: the special elan vital that we know and value has, in effect, 
disappeared. But if our representational capacities are really to be explained – 
naturalistically explained – then at some point the notions ‘representation’ and ‘content’ 
are going to drop out of the account given by the theory, and what is left may look like 
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mere causal relays. The appropriate reaction is not to find fault with the reductive theory 
(assuming it is well-confirmed), or with the urge to subsume the phenomenon of interest 
under more fundamental processes that are better understood. Successful reduction, and 
the unification that it makes possible, is the hallmark of scientific progress.  
 Nonetheless, there is something right about the ‘don’t over-explain’ requirement. 
A reductive account of a phenomenon that is both central to our way of understanding 
ourselves and also, pretheoretically, somewhat mysterious – as life, intentionality, and 
consciousness certainly are – creates an explanatory gap of sorts between the account 
given by the theory and the commonsense conception of the phenomenon with which we 
began, a gap, in other words, between the scientific and the manifest image, as Wilfrid 
Sellars (1962) would have put it.17 This gap typically leaves the reductive theorist with an 
obligation to connect the theory with the pre-theoretically conceived explanatory target, 
and this is precisely the function served by an explanatory gloss. In the case of a 
reductive explanation of our representational abilities, what is required is an intentional 
gloss connecting the theory proper with the intentionally characterized phenomenon with 
which we are pre-theoretically familiar.   
 One needn’t accept my pragmatic account of mental content to see the point. An 
intentional gloss would most likely be needed even if the naturalistic semantics project 
were to succeed in specifying sufficient non-semantic and non-intentional conditions for 
a mental state’s having the meaning it does. There are at least two reasons for this. In the 
first place, existing naturalistic theories, at best, require further conditions to resolve 
indeterminacy. Perhaps striking out in an entirely new direction is a more promising 
 
17 The explanatory gap between reductive proposals for consciousness and phenomenal 
experience is, of course, the most famous example. 
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strategy. In any event, if there are non-semantic and non-intentional conditions that 
ground determinate content they are likely to be highly disjunctive or their specification 
otherwise very complex.18 There is no reason to think that such conditions would be 
explanatory of intentionality, because they would not necessarily contribute to our 
understanding of intentional phenomena in any significant way. The job of connecting 
the naturalistic theory with the target phenomenon – meaning – would be left for a gloss. 
Secondly, a naturalized reduction of intentionality is likely to leave what is distinctively 
personal out of the picture. If there are naturalistic conditions for content, then what we 
think of as distinctively mental representations – thoughts and feelings – may turn out not 
to be special. The conditions may be satisfied by all kinds of mindless systems. For 
example, plants have circadian clocks, and it has been argued that they represent 
temporal properties. But plants are not thought to have what Morgan (2014) calls mental-
grade intentionality. We need to consider the possibility that from a detached, naturalistic 
perspective there may not be any distinctively mental representation. But, of course, 
human minds don’t just present themselves as objects for scientific study; we have direct 
first-person acquaintance with our own states of minds, and it is the phenomena with 
which we are intimately acquainted (thoughts and feelings!) that will seem to have 
disappeared. Reconciling these two perspectives – finding what the theory seems to have 
lost – is a job for a gloss.19 
 
18 A case in point is Fodor’s ultimate (1990, 121) formulation of his asymmetrical 
dependency proposal, which requires three somewhat (in this reader’s opinion) non-
intuitive conditions, and yet still leaves the possibility of (at very least) Quinean 
indeterminacy, and so requires still further conditions. 
19 Much more needs to be said about the relation between the cognitive contents posited 
in explanatory glosses of computational models and personal-level contents, but this issue 
is beyond the scope of the present paper.  
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6. Is the deflationary account empirically accurate? 
 
The deflationary account has recently come under attack as failing to accurately describe 
actual practice in cognitive neuroscience. The charge is that computational theories are 
fully committed to representations; the attribution of representational content is not a 
mere gloss. I shall consider arguments offered by William Bechtel and Michael Rescorla 
in turn. 
 Appealing to the development of theories of spatial representation in the rodent 
brain, Bechtel (2016) argues that:  
“… much neuroscience research is in fact directed at determining which 
neural processes are content bearers and understanding how they represent what 
they do. Content characterizations are not mere glosses on the research; the goal 
of the research is to determine what content the representations have.” (1291) 
The discovery in the 1970s of ‘place cells’ in the rat hippocampus prompted research on 
the role of these cells in navigation, which eventually led to the discovery of other types 
of neurons – grid cells, head-direction cells, boundary cells – whose firings correlate 
reliably with tokenings of various spatial properties in the local environment. These cells 
were shown to interact with place cells in the mechanism responsible for spatial 
navigation. Bechtel says of this and related work: 
A strategy neuroscientists have employed with great success in attempting to 
understand the mechanisms that underlie cognitive abilities is to identify cells in 
which the rate of action potentials increases in response to specific stimulus 
conditions. They then construe such neurons as representing those features in the 
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environment whose presence is correlated with the increased firing and attempt to 
understand how subsequent neural processing utilizes representations that stand in 
for those features of the environment in guiding behavior. (1288) 
So, for example, place cells respond to particular regions of the local environment. They 
are said to represent that location. Head-direction cells are so-named because they 
respond to head direction, and are said to represent head direction. It does not follow, 
however, that these content attributions play an essential role in the theory, or that the 
goal of the research is to “to determine what content the representations have,” as Bechtel 
claims. 
The significant theoretical achievement here is specifying the distal conditions to which 
the cell's firing is responsive and determining its role in controlling subsequent behavior. 
That is the goal of the research, not determining the content that the posited 
representations have. Once the cell’s role in the cognitive process has been characterized 
the theoretical heavy lifting is done. Talk of the cell’s firing representing its distal 
stimulus conditions is a convenience – a gloss – that adds nothing of theoretical 
significance. Recall one of the functions of content ascription I identified earlier: to 
characterize internal structures/states in a way that makes perspicuous their causal role in 
a cognitive process that typically extends into the environment. This is the main function 
of content ascription here.20    
 
20 William Ramsey would deny that place cells and other ‘receptors’ that are regularly 
activated by some distal condition are really representations. He would claim that they 
are ‘mere causal relays’. But it is hard to draw a principled line between these cases and 
others that clearly do seem representational. My strategy is to agree that these cases 
qualify as representational – deploying a deflationary construal of representation, i.e. 
interpreted structures (vehicles) posited in the service of cognitive capacities – and then 
construe the assigned content as part of a heuristic gloss. 
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 Arguing that representational content plays a fundamental role in cognitive 
neuroscience, Bechtel goes on to say: 
… an early and integral step in the investigation of how specific information is 
processed within organisms appeals to representational content to determine 
representational vehicles. Initial characterizations of the vehicles and attributions 
of content are then both subject to revision as more vehicles are discovered and 
the processing mechanisms that generate the relevant activity and respond to it are 
identified. What is especially important is that such additional inquiry is inspired 
and guided by the initial attributions of representational content and directed at 
fleshing out the account. The attribution of content is a first step in articulating an 
account of a mechanism for processing information. (1291) 
 Here Bechtel seems to recognize that the goal of the research is to identify the 
structures and processes responsible for the target capacity. He points out that content 
attributions can play an important role in their discovery, illustrating one of the functions 
of representational content I identified above: to serve as a temporary placeholder for an 
incompletely developed computational theory and to guide the discovery of mechanisms 
underlying the capacity. Characterizing to-be-discovered structures in terms of content 
allows the theorist to formulate hypotheses about the causal roles of the structures she is 
investigating. To be sure, it is not appropriate to call such content ascription a gloss 
because at this early stage there may be little or no theory to gloss – representational 
vehicles have yet to be fully characterized – but the relevant point is that the content 
ascription serves an explicitly heuristic purpose, analogous to glosses deployed in 
developed theories.  
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 In conclusion, the deflationary account I favor explains the rat navigation case 
quite well. And since Bechtel’s argument depends on general features of neuroscientific 
theorizing, there is good reason to think the account will handle a wide range of cases. 
 Another version of the empirical accuracy challenge focuses on a very different 
class of cognitive models. Michael Rescorla argues that my deflationary account is false 
of Bayesian psychological models. He claims that representational content plays a 
fundamental and essential role in Bayesian theorizing: 
Bayesian models individuate both explananda and explanantia in representational 
terms. The science explains perceptual states under representational descriptions, 
and it does so by citing other perceptual states under representational 
descriptions. For instance… the generalizations type-identify perceptual states as 
estimates of specific distal shapes…. Thus, the science assigns representation a 
central role within its explanatory generalizations. The generalizations describe 
how mental states that bear certain representational relations to the environment 
combine with sensory input to cause mental states that bear certain 
representational relations to the environment. (2015, 14, emphasis in original) 
Rescorla claims that Bayesian perceptual models construe perceptual states as essentially 
representational; their distal content plays an essential role in specifying these states. In 
another recent paper, on sensorimotor models, he characterizes the Bayesian program as 
follows:  
Researchers adopt a two-step approach: first, construct a normative model 
describing how an optimal Bayesian decision-maker would proceed; second, fit 
the normative model as well as possible to the data…. Our model yields ceteris 
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paribus generalizations relating sensory input, mental activity, and behavior. We 
evaluate through experimentation how well the generalizations describe actual 
humans. Hence, the basic explanatory strategy is to use Bayesian normative 
models as descriptive psychological tools. This explanatory strategy presupposes 
that the motor system largely conforms (at least approximately) to Bayesian 
norms. (2016a, 31-32).   
 I shall make two points about Rescorla’s characterization of Bayesian 
psychological models. In the first place, and most importantly for the discussion of the 
empirical accuracy of the deflationary account of representation, Bayesian models are 
typically not developed at a level of description that allows us to assess their 
representational commitments. More accurately, they have no representational 
commitments, in the relevant sense. There is no computational implementation – no 
commitment to internal states or structures and causal processes defined on them – and so 
no commitment to representational vehicles, in other words, no commitment to 
representations, in the sense at issue. Bayesian models are the merest of mechanism 
‘sketches’ (in the sense articulated by Piccinini & Craver 2011). It is not simply that we 
don’t know how the models are implemented in neural mechanisms. More relevantly, we 
don't have an account of the causal organization of the system at the level of abstraction 
specified by fR.21 If we had a computational implementation of a Bayesian mechanism 
 
21 Rescorla is at pains to point out that Bayesian models are not committed to what he 
calls ‘formal/syntactic’ computation, claiming 
The science… individuates mental states in representational terms as opposed to 
formal syntactic terms. [2016a, 25 emphasis in original] 
He is right – Bayesian models are not articulated at the level of structures and processes, 
so they are not committed to syntax. But syntactic objects are just one type of 
representational vehicle. A theory is committed to representations only if it posits 
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then, but only then, could we determine whether the contents assigned to the posited 
states play an essential, individuative role in the theory, or whether they function as a 
gloss of the sort I have proposed. This is certainly not intended as a criticism of the 
Bayesian program. In the absence of a computational implementation, how else is the 
theorist to describe to-be-posited internal states and processes except in intentional terms, 
by reference to their presumed distal contents?22 It is merely to note that assessment of 
the representational commitments of specific Bayesian models must await their further 
development.23  
 Secondly, to the extent that a realist construal of Bayesian psychological models 
is appropriate, they are committed to the claim that mental processes are probabilistic 
inferences, and that internal mechanisms compute probability distributions optimally, 
according to Bayes’ theorem.24 Under a natural interpretation, internal structures 
 
representational vehicles and assigns them content (setting aside for present purposes 
whether the content assignment is in the theory or in a gloss), so a characterization of 
mental states in terms of content does not obviate the need to characterize them in terms 
of their causal role in cognitive processes. Simply put: no vehicles, no representations. 
22 Thus, distal content ascription in Bayesian models, whatever else it may do, serves the 
placeholder function described above. 
23 It is worth noting the slide between “explanatory” and “descriptive” in the last two 
sentences of the Rescorla quote above. There is some dispute about the correct 
interpretation of Bayesian models: are they intended to explain actual psychological 
processes, or merely to describe them in a way that systematizes and predicts behavior? 
Colombo and Series (2012) argue for the latter view. They point out that current 
Bayesian models do not provide mechanistic explanations – they do not specify the 
structures and processes that implement Bayesian computations – and argue that at the 
current stage of theorizing an instrumentalist attitude toward the models is appropriate. 
An assessment of this instrumentalist conclusion is beyond the scope of the present paper, 
though see Egan (2017) for defense of the view that a characterization of the function (in 
the mathematical sense) computed in the exercise of a cognitive capacity can be 
explanatory even absent an account of how the capacity is computationally (or neurally) 
implemented. 
24 Under idealization, of course, just as hand calculators and human subjects compute the 
addition function only under idealization. 
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represent probability distributions.25 In any event, Bayesian models, to the extent that 
they say anything about how the brain actually works, give what I have called a function-
theoretic characterization; they specify the function, in the mathematical sense, computed 
by the mechanism.26 The function is specified intensionally by Bayes’ theorem. 
 Rescorla apparently thinks that the mathematical characterization is an artifact of 
our idiosyncratic conventions, rather than a central commitment of Bayesian psychology: 
Bayesian perceptual psychology offers intentional generalizations governing 
probability assignments to environmental state estimates. We articulate the 
generalizations by citing probability distributions and pdfs over mathematical 
entities. But these purely mathematical functions are artifacts of our measurement 
units. They reflect our idiosyncratic measurement conventions, not the underlying 
psychological reality. (2015, 32) 
This is very puzzling. To think that commitment to Bayes’ theorem – a function defined 
on probability distributions – reflects an arbitrary choice of conventions is analogous to 
thinking that a claim that a device computes the addition function reflects a commitment 
to representing addends and sums in base 10.27 Contra Rescorla, to the extent that 
Bayesian models are to be construed realistically – and if they are not, then disputes 
 
25 But, as Wiese (2017) points out, neither textbook Bayesian inference nor approximate 
Bayesian inference (in, for example, predictive processing models) requires representing 
probability values or values of probability density functions. He calls the problem of 
determining how the brain implements an approximation to Bayesian inference the 
probability conundrum and notes that different solutions to it have been proposed in the 
literature. Kwisthout & van Rooij (2013) argue that considerations involving 
computational tractability suggest that explicit representations of probability distributions 
are unlikely to be employed by the brain.  
26 See fn. 7 above. 
27 Rescorla makes the same point in (2016b), arguing against my account of function-
theoretic description that to characterize a device as computing a mathematical function 
is to commit to an arbitrary choice of measurement units. 
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about the status of representational content in Bayesian models are pointless – such 
proposals should be construed as hypotheses about underlying psychological reality, 
committed, in particular, to the claim that the system is computing an approximation to 
Bayes’ theorem.  
 To summarize my reply to the empirical accuracy objection, that is, to the claim 
that theories in cognitive neuroscience and cognitive psychology do in fact make 
essential appeal to representation: (1) If the theory characterizes a cognitive capacity in 
terms of mechanisms, states, and processes (as in the account of rat navigation), then a 
deflationary reinterpretation of the representational talk employed by theorists is 
appropriate. Such talk is playing a gloss-like role. (2) If it does not characterize the 
capacity in terms of mechanisms, states, and processes (as in current Bayesian 
psychological models), then the theory has no representational commitments in the 
relevant sense, that is, no commitment to representations.  
 A final word on the so-called ‘representation wars’, currently raging over whether 
predictive processing models, enactivist accounts, and other recent approaches posit 
representations. The deflationary account is itself neutral in the representation wars. In 
particular, the idea that representational content functions as a kind of gloss has no 
implications for which broad classes of cognitive models, when the computational details 
are spelled out, carry representational commitments (other than ‘classical’ models, which 
undoubtedly do). But the view has implications for how the wars should be settled. A 
cognitive model posits representations just in case it identifies representational vehicles, 
via fR, which play crucial causal roles in the exercise of the capacity, and assign these 
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vehicles contents in fI.28  
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